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Forfeiture of Non-Profit Corporation Charters
Kevin Sheard*
M ANY OF THE PROVISIONS of general corporation law apply to
non-profit corporations in common with corporations for
profit. Yet since the non-profit groups do form a class by them-
selves, it is worthwhile to examine the law on forfeiture of
charter as applied particularly to them. While the closely related
problem of refusal by state officials to issue corporate charters is
of interest, it has been well covered in five excellent legal articles
which were cited as the sole authority in a landmark New York
case.'
There is some confusion in terms because a judicial or ad-
ministrative finding of a forfeiture seems to imply that the cor-
poration is actually out of existence and the court or other
agency is merely giving public recognition of the fact. Actually
a decree or finding of forfeiture is held to be a necessary part
of the ending of the corporate existence. 2 Without the official
action the corporate life goes on regardless of what has happened
which might justify the official action. This is graphically illus-
trated in the case of California Labor School v. Subversive Activ-
ities Control Board.3 The United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia held that the mere cessation of business
was not the equivalent of a finding of a dissolution and termina-
tion of existence. Similar findings are frequent when an out-
sider attacks the existence of the corporation to show that it is
* Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall Law School of Baldwin-Wallace
College.
1 Association for the Preservation of Freedom of Choice v. Shapiro, 9 N. Y.
2d 376, 214 N. Y. Supp. 2d 388, 174 N. E. 2d 487 (1961). The law review
articles cited are found in 55 Col. L. Rev. 380 (1955), 66 Yale L. J. 545-550
(1957), 6 Howard L. J. 169 (1960), 46 Cornell L. Q. 290 (1961), and 12 Bus.
Lawyer 454 (1956). Note the opinion of Brennan, J. in In re Fraternidad
Hispana-Americana, 39 N. Y. Misc. 2d 106, 240 N. Y. Supp. 2d 110 (1963),
which if followed will severely limit the doctrine laid down in Assn. for
Freedom of Choice.
2 In some states officers of the executive department may find a forfeiture.
See, for example, Utah, where the Secretary of State may, on notice and
hearing, declare a non-profit corporation charter forfeit. Note the vigorous
dissent by Henriod, J. in Entre Nous Club v. Toronto, 4 Utah 2d 98, 287 P.
2d 670 (1955), in which he attacks (albeit unsuccessfully) the power of the
Secretary of State as being in derogation of due process. As to procedure
see, Oleck, Non-Profit Corporations and Associations, Sec. 229 (1956).
3 322 F. 2d 393 (D. C. App. 1963). This case is unusual because it was the
corporation itself which pleaded its non-existence.
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incapable of taking property. Lacking a formal determination
of forfeiture, even the fact that the corporation has turned over
all its assets to another will not prevent it from taking property
willed to it.
4
Even provision in the articles and constitution of a parent
lodge cannot be used to show that there has been a termination
of an incorporated sub-lodge. A dissolution under "Theosophical
Law" notwithstanding, the sub-group continued as a corporation
until such time as a court might decree the forfeiture.5 This is
not to say that there might not be other penalties for failure to
exercise the franchise, as, for example, a disqualification to act
as trustee.6
Granted, then, that some formal procedure is necessary to
terminate the corporate existence, the question of what kinds of
proceedings are necessary arises. In general, these are judicial,
although in a few states other officers are invested with the
appropriate authority.7 For the purposes of this note the differ-
ence between quo warranto and an information or proceeding in
the nature of a quo warranto will be ignored. In either case there
is a challenge by the state to the continued existence of the cor-
poration. This is, however, not the only method of instituting
proceedings. Where members of the corporation are wronged,
as opposed to situations where the public is wronged, those
members may maintain an action for forfeiture and dissolution.8
Where two or more non-profit corporations have been or-
ganized to serve a public purpose, may one directly attack the
other for failure to carry out the common purpose? Despite its
title, People ex rel. Vivisection Investigation League v. American
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals9 was a private
action, because the Attorney General of New York had refused
to act. The burden of the League's complaint was that the
Association was not really carrying out the purpose for which
4 Old Colony Trust v. 3rd Universalist Society of Cambridge, 285 Mass. 146,
188 N. E. 711, 91 A. L. R. 837 (1934). Here the corporation successfully as-
serted its continued existence.
5 Keeler v. Schultz, 47 Cal. 2d 801, 306 P. 2d 430 (1957).
6 Syrian Antiochean St. George's Orthodox Church v. Ghize, 258 Mass. 74,
154 N. E. 839 (1927).
7 See note 2 supra.
8 Hughes v. Schwartz (Appeal of the 11th Ward Republican Club), 389
Penna. 103, 132 A. 2d 681 (Penna. 1957). The wrongs complained of included
failure to elect officers, sale of beer, and absence of corporate purpose.




it was organized in that it did not strongly condemn the docking
of horses' tails. The court held that even though the two organi-
zations shared a purpose, that fact did not grant standing for an
attack on the franchise of one by the other.
Another method of attack on an existing non-profit corpora-
tion is through an outside "remainderman" who would take over
the corporate assets in the event of a forfeiture. In a Pennsyl-
vania case, the Presbytery of Philadelphia successfully main-
tained that it had standing to sue for the forfeiture and dissolu-
tion of the Susquehanna Avenue Presbyterian Church, which
had repudiated the tenets of the parent body. The reasoning
was based on the fact that the articles of the local church pro-
vided that its purpose was to uphold the Presbyterian faith and
forms of worship with a proviso that in case of dissolution its
assets were to go to the Presbytery.10
Pennsylvania, which has a system of judicial approval prior
to the granting of articles of incorporation of non-profit organiza-
tions, was the scene of an attempt to insert still another method
of attack on the existence of the corporation. In Sherman et al.
v. Yiddisher Kultur Farband" a non-member petitioned the
court which had approved the charter of what he described as a
Communist front organization, for a decision of nullity of the
articles. His reasoning was that a Communist front organization
had obtained its articles by a fraudulent application which con-
cealed its true nature. Further, the very nature of the Com-
munist activities was such that they were unlawful. The Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania overruled the lower court, which
had ousted the corporation, on the ground that a non-member of
the group had no standing to sue for dissolution since he had
no private interest, but it indicated that had the lower court
on its own motion instituted the proceedings it then could prop-
erly have ousted the corporation. Mr. Justice Musmanno dis-
sented. In his characteristically colorful language, he argued
that the lower court was entitled to be informed by anyone who
knew of a gross fraud perpetrated upon it. It should then be
permitted to cleanse its records "once it is proved they have
been contaminated by a perjurious hand, leprous with deception,
deceit and betrayal." 12
10 In re dissolution of The Susquehanna Ave. Presbyterian Church, 31
District and County Repts. 597 (Penna. 1938).
11 375 Penna. 108, 99 A. 2d 868 (1963).
12 Ibid, p. 871.
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Without attempting to argue the merits of a judicial method
of approving articles before incorporation, it is obvious that
such a revocation by "cleansing the record" should be confined
to states where such prior judicial review exists. 13
In Ohio the Secretary of State chartered the National
Knights of the Ku Klux Klan of Ohio, Inc., on October 5, 1964.14
Immediately, public outcries arose, with statements from politi-
cians denouncing the action. Finally, on October 21, 1964, the
Secretary of State announced that the articles had been accepted
by mistake and that he was revoking them. This procedure dif-
fered from- that in the Yiddisher Kultur Farband case 15 in two
respects, one favorable to its validity and one contra. First, it
met the criterion laid down by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
that the "cleansing of the record" be by the issuing authority
(the lower court which had approved the articles in the Penn-
sylvania case) on its own motion. Second, the Secretary of State,
not being a court would presumably not be qualified to adjust
his own records. In Ohio the case is headed for the courts and
the decision may or may not follow the Pennsylvania case with
respect to these points of difference.
Non-Criminal Grounds for Forfeiture
Assuming that there is standing for challenging a non-profit
corporation's right to exist, the question of grounds arises. The
usual ones alleged are non-user and mis-user.1 6 Although it is
perhaps a matter of little practical importance, the line between
mis-user and non-user can be very blurred indeed in some cases.
In the case of State ex rel. Denu v. Rapid City Library Associa-
tion,17 the association was chartered to open a reading room in
Rapid City and to furnish it with reading material. Originally
the library was in fact maintained in Rapid City and there was a
librarian who tended a collection of literature which was con-
stantly being added to. Later the librarian was dropped and the
books were left unguarded. Eventually the material which
had not been stolen or lost was transferred to a state institution
one mile distant from the heart of Rapid City.
13 E.g., Purdon's Penna. Stat. Annot., Corporations, Sec. 2851-207.
14 Cleveland Plain Dealer, October 6, 1964.
15 See n. 11, supra.
16 CJ.S., Corporations, Secs. 1656 and 1663.




The South Dakota Supreme Court held that forfeiture was
indicated for failure to furnish the services called for in its
charter. The problem with this case lies in the fact that some
of the purposes provided for in the articles were in fact being
carried out. That is, books were provided even though there
was a long period in which fresh material was not added to the
collection. Can it validly be said that the one mile difference in
location was fatal to the purpose of the corporation? Finally,
although the court made much of the absence of a librarian, such
a functionary was not provided for in the articles. It would
seem that the discussion was irrelevant. In justice to the court it
should be noted that there was some evidence that the room
of the association was used by another. It would appear, though,
that a mere prohibition of the practice would suffice to correct
that evil.'5
Is the rule, then, that all of the powers and purposes of a
corporation must be exercised? Many courts have held that the
answer is, "No." The Texas charter of the First Divine Associa-
tion in America provided, among other things, that the association
would maintain nurses' quarters and a school. It did not do so,
but it proceeded in doing what the court considered its major
purpose, that of "preaching the gospel of the Divine Lord." Thus,
the articles were not subject to forfeiture.19
While failure to carry out the purposes of the corporation is
frequently linked to a mis-user because of diversion of assets,
the mis-user is usually considered a separate ground. In the
case of the Kansas City Medical School 20 the grounds merged
almost indistinguishably. The school kept no records, was oper-
ated for private gain, sold diplomas, had incompetent students
instructing other students, had no real four year program, and
no hospital. For good measure, it was shown that the "students"
never came into contact with a sick person. Understandably, the
court in this and a similar case 2 1 did not trifle with defining mis-
user and non-user, but simply ordered ousters.
18 See, State ex rel. Little v. Regents of University, 55 Kan. 389, 40 P. 656
(1895).
19 State v. First Divine Association in America, 248 S. W. 2d 291 (Tex.
1952).
20 State ex rel. Otto v. Kansas City College of Medicine and Surgery, 315
Mo. 101, 285 S. W. 980 (1926).
21 State ex rel. Otto v. St. Louis College of Medicine and Surgery, 317 Mo.
49, 295 S. W. 537 (1927).
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Yet, mis-user need not be accompanied by a non-user or
even a defeat of the purposes of the corporation. In an early
Ohio case, a Farmers' College which was formed to give instruc-
tion in agriculture and to maintain a professorship of agriculture
was found to be instructing females and offering a great many
other courses which greatly diminished the importance of the
agricultural department. While the court admitted that the
enrollment of the females might be a mis-user (it did not decide),
this did not in anyway defeat the purposes of the corporation,
nor did the growth of departments other than agriculture. The
existence of the mis-user was not ground for forfeiture although
it might be for an injunction ousting the practice. 22
The same court was not so lenient with another college which
some years later leased itself to an entrepreneur for $180.00 per
year. The lessee under the corporate charter was entitled to
keep all receipts, and awarded degrees on the basis of other
institutions' transcripts and the writing of a thesis. The ques-
tion of the profit making aside, the court found that such award-
ing of degrees was a mis-user and justified ouster.23
While the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia was
not faced with the question of ouster, since all that was asked for
was an injunction, the question arose there in 1923. Here the
National Association of Certified Public Accountants awarded
"degrees" of C.P.A. Such a power was stated in its articles,
but not in the statute under which its incorporation was ef-
fected. The court upheld the granting of an injunction against
awarding degrees, but in its dictum went further and announced
that such an abuse of the powers granted by statute was ground
for forfeiture.2 4 It should be noted that here there was no allega-
tion that the association had failed to carry out the legitimate
purposes authorized by the statute under which it was
incorporated.
Non-Profit or Profit Corporation?
The problem of how to recognize a non-profit corporation has
engaged the courts for some time. In Ohio, for instance, a so-
called non-profit burial association was so rigged as to act pri-
22 State v. Farmers' College, 32 Ohio State 799 (1877).
23 State ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Mount Hope College, 63 Ohio State 341, 58
N. E. 799 (1900).




marily as a device by which a burial company could make
contracts with people for their own funerals. On paper the
association made mass contracts with the company, which then
allowed a 20% discount from the price of the funeral chosen by
the lucky members. Since the burial company was the "official
undertaker" to the association and could determine its own
prices for the chosen funeral, it was apparent that the non-
profit corporation was admirably suited to serve the purposes
of the burial company, as the 20% discount could be made to
disappear by raising the list prices. This was strengthened by
the fact that the trustees of the association were the same
individuals as the officers and directors of the company. There
were a number of other abuses, which except for the fact that
no trustee elections were held, are not here relevant. The court
ordered that elections of trustees be held, and apparently felt
that these elections would cure the defect of close alliance with
the company.2 5
In a short opinion, a New York court held that an associa-
tion whose ostensible purpose was to provide ambulances to the
American and Canadian armies during the Second World War
was really a profit making corporation. It did this from evidence
that each solicitor was entitled to 40% of the membership fee
paid by each person he solicited as a member.26 The court was
undoubtedly influenced by the rash of questionable war relief
societies pursuing projects of doubtful utility. It left unsolved,
however, an important question. Granted that under some cir-
cumstances 40% is too much to pay a solicitor, what is the
proper measure of compensation? Many organizations do pay
solicitors. It may be a quite necessary method of obtaining sup-
port for worthy causes. But that is another subject.
In the medical college cases in Missouri, and in other sim-
ilar cases in other states,27 a strong case was made out for
forfeiture even independently of other abuses on the grounds that
the earnings of the schools went into private pockets. In the
Mount Hope College case,28 the profit making was an element
which the court thought justified forfeiture of the charter.
25 State ex rel. Wachenheimer v. Toledo etc. Burial Assn., 18 Ohio Circ. Ct.
Op. 233 (1906).
26 Bennett, Atty. Gen. v. American-Canadian Ambulance Corps, Inc., 179
N. Y. Misc. 21, 37 N. Y. Supp. 2d 470 (1942).
27 See n. 20 and 21 supra. See also, Independent Medical College v. Akin,
Atty. Gen., 182 Ill. 274, 55 N. E. 345 (1899).
28 See n. 23, supra.
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Closely allied, but not identical to using the corporation as
private property, is the question of wastage of assets of the cor-
poration. In one case a society originally formed in the eight-
eenth century had for its purpose the support of a group of
monk-like members of the Dunkard Sect. Eventually, the last
of the monastic members died and there was no new recruiting.
The corporation continued to exist, however, and over the years
sold land belonging to it and gradually dispersed many of the
assets through ways not made clear in the opinion. The result
was that the court dissolved the corporation, stating that even
though some assets were left to the corporation the wastage of
some demonstrated that the organization had no valid purpose.2 9
Anti-Social Activities
Out and out anti-social uses of the non-profit corporation
are, of course, grounds for forfeiture. The courts take the posi-
tion that these activities, being criminal, or quasi-criminal, are
beyond the powers of the corporation and the corporation is
charged with performing acts not within their charters. It would
appear simpler to short cut the rulings and to make criminal
activity per se punishable by forfeiture.
The cases show that the earlier non-profit corporations were
charged primarily with evasion of the local option liquor laws
by running grog shops.- ° Occasionally there would be an attempt
to circumvent the laws against prize fighting.31 In any event,
these cases are so few as to suggest that no one really cared
about the circumvention.
Another kind of illegal activity was involved in People v.
White Circle League of America.32 This case was connected with
the constitutional case of Beauharnais v. Illinois33 and was con-
cerned with violation of the Illinois statute against group libel.
After finding that the League was guilty of violating the law,
the court stated the issue as "whether the persistent violation of
a criminal law by a corporation amounts to the exercise of
29 Commonwealth ex rel. Schnader, Atty. Gen. v. Seventh Day Baptists of
Ephrata, 317 Penna. 358, 176 A. 17 (1935).
30 E.g., State v. Easton Social, Literary and Musical Club, 73 Md. 97, 20 A.
783 (1840).
31 State on inf. of Wear v. Business Men's Athletic Club, 178 Mo. App. 548,
163 S. W. 901 (1914).
32 408 Ill. 564, 97 N. E. 2d 811.




powers not conferred by law which justified the annulment of its
charter 34 ... ?" Without hesitation, the court answered its own
question in the affirmative.
Communist Activities
A relatively new ground for attack on the franchise of a
non-profit corporation is that its name appears on the subversive
list of the Attorney General of the United States or on a list
promulgated on the authority of a state board or commission.
The tribulations of the Yiddisher Kultur Farband give some
guide to the ways in which this will be handled by the courts.
As pointed out above, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
originally held that the attack, if any, must be brought by the
Attorney General of the commonwealth. 35 Later the issue was
presented by the Attorney General in a new case.3 While the
United States Attorney General's list was not introduced into
the case, evidence was adduced to show that the organization was
in fact organized for the purpose of carrying on Communist
propaganda. However, before the court could meet the issue
squarely, the Farband caved in and agreed to dissolve. The
remainder of the litigation revolved around whether or not the
group could handle its own dissolution.
In New York the question of the relevance of the Attorney
General's list was squarely met. The International Worker's
Order was attacked and, in support of the application for voiding
its charter, the state Attorney General showed that the organiza-
tion was on the national list of subversive organizations." The
Supreme Court, Special Term, held that mere listing as a sub-
versive organization by the Attorney General of the United
States, ex parte, is not ground for dissolution as the element of
due process is lacking in such a unilateral action. The court
held, however, that proof of Communist affiliation, coupled with
a present danger of defrauding citizens, was sufficient to justify
forfeiture of the franchise. Specifically, here, the danger lay in
the fact that the assets of the corporation were kept liquid and
84 N. 32, supra, p. 814. See also, Symposium on Group Defamation, 13 Clev-
Mar. L. R. 1-117 (1964).
85 Sherman v. Yiddisher Kultur Farband, 375 Penna. 108, 99 A. 2d 868
(1953).
36 Commonwealth ex rel. Truscott v. Yiddisher Kultur Farband, 382 Penna.
553, 116 A. 2d 555 (1955).
87 Application of Bohlinger in re I. W. 0., 106 N. Y. Supp. 2d 953 (1951).
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the court felt that the state Attorney General was justified in
feeling that this was to permit easy transfer of these funds to the
Soviet Union. This opinion was affirmed by the Appellate
Division of the Supreme Court.3 s
The question whether the criminal activity, if such there
be, is that of the corporation or of its agents also arises. In the
liquor law evasion cases the question of disavowal by the cor-
poration of the acts of the agents did not arise.39 It did, however,
come up in an early Alabama case where a society ostensibly
for the raising of funds for the state museum was charged with
conducting a thinly disguised lottery. Its defense was that its
agents were disregarding instructions given to them. On its at-
tempt to introduce evidence as to what its instructions actually
were the state objected. The upper court ruled that despite
its own skepticism the defendant was entitled to show that there
was a difference between the activities of the corporation and
those of its agents.40
In the New York case already referred to above, the Interna-
tional Worker's Order attempted to separate itself from the
officers and directors. 41 It was shown by the state that, of ten
officers six were members of the Communist Party, of twenty-
two members of the executive committee 16 were members of
the party, and the corporation conducted a distribution of litera-
ture favorable to the Communist Party.
The New York Supreme Court, after making the point that
this kind of affiliation was clearly equivalent to corporate action
which could not be avoided by simply pointing to the agents as
the solely responsible parties, then called attention to the Smith
Act as defining the criminal nature of the activities. Dropping
that aspect, the court went on in the narrower field and held that
since the corporation was acting for political ends "whether
Democratic, Republican, or Communist" it was exceeding its
charter rights. Further, since it was in fact organized to pro-
mote the Communist cause it had perpetrated a fraud on the
state by its application for a charter as a fraternal benefit society.
It was, thus, a fit subject for a judicial determination of forfeiture.
38 113 N. Y. Supp. 2d 755 (1951).
39 See n. 30, supra.
40 Tuscaloosa Scientific and Art Assn. v. State ex rel. Murphy, 58 Ala. 54
(1877).




It is interesting to note that in Mr. Justice Musmanno's
dissent to the opinion of the court in the first Yiddisher Kultur
Farband case, he laid great stress on the element of Communist
affiliation.4 2 He felt that it would be sufficient to forfeit the
charter. While he spoke as a dissenter, it does not follow that
the court would not go along with him in a proper case. Here
the issue before the court was not whether forfeiture was justi-
fied, but rather on the procedural course to take. While it is
unlikely that the court would adopt the vigorous language of the
dissent in that case, they probably would have adopted the
principle in the second case had not the Farband consented to
dissolution.
As in the case of business corporations, non-profits are sub-
ject to dissolution when the carrying out of their objects becomes
impossible by reason of a deadlock among those in control of the
group.43 In Olechny v. Thedeus Kosciuszko Society of Thomp-
sonville, Conn., Inc., an ecclesiastical schism resulted in a dead-
locked association. Originally founded by members of the Ro-
man Catholic Church, the society had a by-law by which five
black balls would automatically exclude any prospective member.
All apparently went well until the Polish National Catholic
Church was formed and about one-third of the members of the
society decided to join the new church. The majority of the
members attempted to fine the dissenters who did not appear
at the Roman Catholic Sacraments. The minority retaliated
by blackballing all proposed members who were Roman Cath-
olics. When the majority took the same action against the ad-
herents of the Polish National Church, suit was brought for
dissolution, alleging that it was impossible to carry out the
group purpose. Pending the hearing of the suit, the majority
(Roman Catholic) amended the by-laws to eliminate the black-
ball provision and to limit new membership to Roman Cath-
olics. The lower court held that such changes did not cure the
impossibility to carry on. The Supreme Court of Errors of
Connecticut, by a 5-3 decision, ruled otherwise. They reasoned
that since the by-laws were amendable by a majority vote, the
outlawing of the blackball was within the power of the group.
Similarly, confining new membership to Roman Catholics was
permissible. Some crumb of comfort was available to the Polish
42 N. 31, supm.
43 128 Conn. 534, 24 A. 2d 249 (1942).
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National group in that the court found that fines were beyond
the power of the corporation.
This case could be taken as illustrative of the reluctance of
the courts to order forfeiture. It can, however, be criticised on
the grounds that however nice the legalisms, the Polish National
group would find that all new members were opposed to their
interests. In effect, the Roman Church group could recruit new
members freely while the smaller group could not. Thus, the
organization was reformed to penalized dissenters from an out-
side organization, i.e., the Roman Catholic Church, this in the
interests of finding no deadlock.
Conclusion
From the foregoing the strong resemblance to the law gov-
erning corporations for profit will be noticed. The few differ-
ences which exist, such as that of the "remainderman," arise
from the nature of the non-profit corporation.
All in all the cases on forfeiture of non-profit charters are
not common. When the number of charters which have been
granted is compared with the number of forfeitures it is apparent
that one of two situations prevails. Either the organizations and
their operators are extremely law abiding or they are simply
not being supervised with enough vigor by those charged with
keeping them honest.
May, 1965
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